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The end of the “cold war” brought about far-reaching changes in interna-
tional relations. The bipolar world has ceased to exist, while the new interna-
tional order, based on emerging new power realities and structures, i.e. based on
multiplicity, is yet to be established. These changes are directly affecting
Mongolia’s geopolitical environment. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union
and especially normalization of Sino-Soviet/Russian relations, Mongolia’s geo-
political role as a buffer state has diminished. However Russia’s natural unwill-
ingness to be downgraded to a mere regional, second-grade power and China’s
ascendance as a new world power will surely increase Mongolia’s role (and that
of other states of Central Asia) as a buffer, whose orientation would surely affect
future balance of power and interests not only between Russia and China, but in
the region as a whole.
Today’s geopolitical changes offer both challenges and opportunities for
Mongolia. For the first time since the 17th century Mongolia has the opportu-
nity to change its role from a mere pawn (or on object) in great power relations
into a relatively independent, though weak, actor in international relations by
overcoming its geopolitical virtual isolation and extending its foreign relations.
This is made possible mainly because of the change in power relations between
its two neighbors and Mongolia’s growing ties with other states, especially
influential ones.
The future of Mongolia’s security will still to a large extent depend on its
relations with the neighbors, relations between them, especially on communities
and differences of their national interests, and on a broader scale on the rela-
tions among regional powers: Russia, China, Japan, the United States and in the
not so distant future, a United Korea. Nevertheless, it will also depend to some
extent on Mongolia’s own policies, its future role in international relations, es-
pecially on the competitiveness of its economy.
National security concept
It is under these circumstances that Mongolia has elaborated its national
security concept and strategy. The concept rightly stresses the vital role of
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external factors on Mongolia’s security. It also identifies the areas of security
concern, the main one being the security of existence of Mongolia’ as a sover-
eign nation.
In elaborating its national security doctrine, Mongolia has bore in mind its
past experience, when during the major part of this century its national interests
were identified with or subordinated to the alien ideological principles of prole-
tarian and socialist internationalisms. These principles were in fact an ideologi-
cal cover-up for and justification of Soviet policies, served to promote Soviet
interests in its client states and throughout the world.
The new national security concept clearly defined the vital interests of
Mongolia as consisting in the existence of the Mongolian people and their
civilization, in the country’s indecencies, sovereignty, and territorial integrity,
inviolability of state frontiers, relative economic independence, sustainable eco-
logical development and national unity.
Like the vital interests of other states, these interests constitute the object
of special care and protection on the part of the Mongolian state and people. In
other words, Mongolia’s policy towards other states, including its neighbors,
shall to a large extent be conditional on their attitude vis-a-vis its clearly defined
vital interests.
Mongolia’s approach to its security, unlike in the past, is a broad one. Its
past excessive and obsessive view of security as being mainly of a military
nature from the outside and of class nature from the inside pushed it into the
arms of one superpower, thus further isolating it from the outside world.
An excessively ideologies, exaggerated understanding of internal secu-
rity threats led to physical and political purging of its elite and intellectuals, of
an entire stratum of society. The unity of the nation become very fragile, since
members of society were divided into reliable and nonreplicable.
The nine areas of security concern are the security of the existence of
Mongolia, of the social order and state system, of citizens’ rights and freedoms,
economic security, scientific and technological security, security of information
of Mongolian civilization (i.e. of culture and lifestyle), security of the population
and its gene pool and ecological security.
The security concept clearly identifies the nature and forms of external
and internal threats in the above-mentioned areas of concern and lays out the
ways and means to prevent, cope with or eliminate the threat. Mongolia believes
that the policy of ensuring and strengthening the national security should aim
at identifying and eliminating any threats at the “probable” stage of its occur-
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rence, as well as at reducing or preventing objective threats by timely eliminat-
ing subjective ones. The concept also defines internal and external guarantees
of national security, the role of specific state organs, of political and public
organizations as well as individual citizens in ensuring national security.
Mongolia’s vision of and approach to its national security have been
formally reflected in the “security concept” adopted by the State Great Hural
(parliament) in 1994 and has been published in the press. When publishing the
document, the parliament was proceeding from the fact that implementation of
the provisions of the concept depended to a large extent on proper understand-
ing and support by its people, as well as by its neighbors and other states.
Mongolia’s neighbors and security
Proceeding from the policy political realism in international relations,
Mongolia has declared its relations with the two neighbors as its top foreign
policy priority. A political debate in the early 1990s centered on what kind of
policy to adopt with respect to the two neighbors: whether to try to maintain
alliance or special relations with Russia, bearing in mind its history, national
experience and virtual economic dependence on Russia, or declare strict neu-
trality (like Switzerland and other neutral countries) or find some other suitable
“prescription” that would take into account Mongolia’s geopolitical reality and
the interests of its neighbors. The first option was rejected bearing in mind its
recent experience, when during the Sino-Soviet cold war, i.e.between 1960 and
midl980’s Soviet troops had been stationed in Mongolia and therefore its terri-
tory was in fact one of the potential battlefields of the two “red giants” with all
the possible ensuing consequences. Furthermore, to make matters worse, there
was no guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used. The second option
was also rejected on the grounds that strict neutrality of a small, economically
weak, land-locked state, sandwiched between two major competing powers would
not hold because of its economic and political vulnerability to outside pressure.
Strict neutrality would require some degree of political and economic weight,
none of which Mongolia has. On the other hand, absence of any political dis-
pute with its neighbors creates favorable conditions for strengthening trust,
developing good-neighborly and mutually beneficial cooperation.
Political realism and pragmatism prompted Mongolia to adopt a policy of
ensuring its security primarily by political means and of a “balanced relation-
ship” with respect to its powerful neighbors. Maintaining a balanced relation-
ship is not seen as keeping equidistance between them or taking identical posi-
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tions on all issues. This policy means strengthening trust and developing all-
round good-neighborly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with both
of them. As it was mentioned earlier, in relations with these countries, due ac-
count is taken of their policies in regard to the national interests of Mongolia,
and above all to its clearly defined vital national interests. Political declarations
aside, much in this regard, depends on the degree of continuity and change in
the policies of these neighbors towards Mongolia.
Bearing in mind its experience from the sixties to the mid-eighties above,
Mongolia declared that in case of future disputes between Russia and China, it
would pursue a policy of non-evolvement and neutrality, unless the disputes
affect its vital national interests. In the latter case Mongolia would follow its
vital interests.
As a practical step towards realizing its policy of balanced relationship
with China and Russia, Mongolia has declared non-alignment with any great
power, and that it would not allow any state to use its territory for the purpose of
committing acts of aggression or any other violent acts, nor would conclude
any treaty or agreement that would run counter to the sovereignty and indepen-
dence of its neighbors are. Moreover mindful that the two neighbors nuclear
powers, Mongolia has declared its territory a nuclear-weapons free zone and
thus has pledged not to allow the stationing in or transiting through of any
nuclear weapons or parts thereof. Mongolia’s policy non-stationing of foreign
troops on its territory or transit through it is in full conformity with the Sino-
Russian declaration not to use the territory, territorial waters and airspace of
other countries against each other.
In the past few years Mongolia has not only declared its policy of bal-
anced relationship with respect to China and Russia, but has also obtained their
support in this regard, as subsequently reflected in the bilateral treaties con-
cluded with each of them. The nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) status has
received the endorsement of all nuclear weapons states, as well as of the entire
non-alignment movement. The joint statement by nuclear weapons states, which
includes both of Mongolia’s neighbors in support of the status would give
additional weight to its NWFZ policy, making it a mere than a more declaration of
good intent and thus jointly filling in some of political vacuum created by the
Soviet Russian virtual political withdrawal.
Mongolia has pledged to respect the sovereignty of its neighbors and not
to interfere in their internal affairs. This means that it has no  % interest in or
intention to use the so-called Mongolian nationality card to foment dissent in
China or Russia.
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The absence of any political dispute with its neighbors does not necessar-
ily mean the absence of any problems. Mongolia and Russia have numerous
problems and questions, inherited from the Soviet era, which relate mainly to
economic issues. Thus the debt issue still remains unresolved. Bearing in mind
the “socialist” system of economic relations, which was highly politicized,
Mongolia views the debt issue as primarily of a political nature and thus should
be resolved mainly by political means, while the Russians, on the other hand,
believe that the issue is mainly economic. Other questions are arising in connec-
tion with difficulties and inexperience resulting from the transition of our econo-
mies and economic relations from highly centralized and subsidized to market-
oriented.
Factors beyond Mongolia, such as a resurgent Russian nationalism, its
relations with China, Central Asian neighbors, Russia’s perception of its secu-
rity threat, especially in connection with NATO’s possible eastward expansion
or international isolation could compel Russia to embrace Mongolia again as a
possible buffer or its all, a move that Mongolia would not be enthusiastic about.
Nor would Mongolia be interested to be perceived as an ally or accomplice of
Russia’s adversary. On the other hand, only Mongolia’s perception of imminent
external threat from other powers could push it into the arms or “security um-
brella” of Russia, a move that could alter the balance of power and interests in
this part of the region.
With respect to China, our relations, frozen for about quarter of a century
as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, are rapidly developing. China’s share in
Mongolia’s over-all trade turnover is increasing rapidly. Both countries have
opened seasonal border crossing points, while their citizens are traveling more
freely and frequently across the border.
Nevertheless, Mongolia is concerned about increasing Chinese economic
power which could, willy-nilly, by filling some of the economic vacuum left by
the Soviet/withdrawal, draw Mongolia into the Chinese economic sphere of
influence with all its ensuing consequences. The other long-term concern on
the Mongolian side is the potential objective need for China to expand its living
space (Lebensraum) by the middle of the next century. Moreover, China’s some-
what ambiguous position on Mongolia’s independence also gives rise to un-
ease and concern. Though officially China does not question Mongolia’s sov-
ereignty, Chinese writings medieval and recent history persistently distorts
Mongolia’s history, its relation with China and Russia, and thus throws a shadow
on Mongolia’s sovereignty. This persistence is giving rise to uneasy feelings
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among Mongolians. Continuing nuclear tests near Mongolian territory and on-
going projects to dump nuclear wastes in territories adjacent to Mongolia are
also arousing uneasy feelings and alarm in Mongolia.
On the other hand, China (like to some extent Russia) is apprehensive of
Mongolia’s policy towards the Mongol living in China. Neither Mongolia’s
assurances of respect for China’s sovereignty and non-interference in Chinese
affairs, nor common logic of the suicidal consequences of any merger of Inner
Mongolia with Mongolia allay the fears of China. Moreover, despite Mongolia’s
pledge of non-admittance of the use of its territory against its neighbors, Chi-
nese suspicions seem to persist, or at least the Chinese pretend that there is
such lingering apprehension.
It is admissible that either of the two neighbors could have doubts not
about Mongolia’s commitment to its policy of non-alignment and balanced rela-
tionship with respect to its neighbors, but rather about its actual ability to
deliver, to implement that policy, given the fact that its power or rather lack of it,
compared to Russian China is too small to ensure evenhandedness with respect
to them.
Third neighbor
Mongolia’s open, multitasked foreign policy is designed not only to over-
come its relative isolation from the outside world. It is also intended to acceler-
ate its development and, Mongolia being a political and economic lightweight,
to add some weight as well as to obtain some credible counterweights to its
northern and southern heavyweight neighbors. Hence its foreign policy priority
is to develop broad relations with highly developed countries, such as the USA,
Japan, and Germany and so on, as well as with influential countries like India, the
Republic of Korea, end Turkey and to create economic interests of these coun-
tries in Mongolia. For it is understandable that despite its interest in and politi-
cal will to pursue its declared policy, the stark imbalance of power itself, i.e. lack
of political and economic weight of Mongolia necessary to consistently imple-
ment its declared policy, prompted it to search for political and economic coun-
terweights. Hence Mongolia is looking for a third neighbor, understanding full
well that not one single state but a group of states would together add up to a
“third neighbor”.
Regional mechanisms
The policy of ensuring its security by political means is not restricted to
acquiring a third neighbor or rapidly developing its economy and increasing its
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international profile and economic competitiveness. It also means joining re-
gional organizations that would not only integrate Mongolia into the commu-
nity of nations, promote its foreign policy aims, but would also reduce the stark
imbalance of power with regard to its two neighbors by somewhat diluting their
overwhelming power in regional mechanisms. Hence Mongolia’s interest in join-
ing ARF, APEC and other regional for.
In its turn, Mongolia is also interested in making its contribution to main-
taining international security. Thus it has offered its territory to be
Used as part of an international network to monitor compliance of states-
parties with the comprehensive test ban treaty to be finalized and adopted this
year. Bearing in mind Mongolia’s geostrategic location, the offer was accepted
by the world community.
Central Asian factor
An important factor in the country’s external security environment will be
Central Asia with its problems and promises. The Central Asian sub-region is
becoming a vast arena of international, especially great power, relations that
could shift the balance of power and interests on the entire Eurasian landmass,
the impact of, which is difficult to foretell or underestimate. Geographically, and
some respect politically, it is difficult to confine this sub-region to the five newly
emerged states only, without at least including Afghanistan, Mongolia as well
as parts of China and Russia.
While crystallization of national interests of the newly emerged states is
underway, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan as well as remote USA,
Germany, France and Japan are all formulating their political lines based on their
national interests.
The emerging Central Asian geopolitical and economic sub-region consti-
tutes both a challenge and an opportunity. Though abundance of human and
natural resources is a positive economic factor, lack of an appropriate infrastruc-
ture and of direct cases to the sea are very serious handicaps that cannot be
overcome easily.
The development of a trans Asian railway, of auto and air routes, of oil and
gas pipelines, exploitation of natural resources would surely increase the role
and importance of this sub-region in the years to come, which could in the long
run serve as an available link between Europe or Ireland and South and South-
east Asia. On the other the 10,900 km long transcontinental rail container service
between Qinghuangdao in Hebei, China and Rotterdam, the Netherlands which
began to operate, is precursor of more links like that.
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In the political sphere, it is too early to predict the geopolitical contours
that the region choice take, although the neighboring and other states are al-
ready trying to shape the sub-region’s contours to their own interests or at least
not opposed to them.
It is believed that some countries want to see the sub-region as an exten-
sion of the Islamic world, while others as their sphere of influence. The compe-
tition and rivalry for the nearest and minds, for the loyalty of the peoples of this
sub-region is well underway, while the five newly emerged states are still in
search of their own identity after having suddenly become in dependent. The
geopolitical contours of the sub-region will have far-reaching international im-
plications because it is situated between two of the five declared nuclear powers
- Russia and China - as well as such near nuclear states as Iran, India and
Pakistan, which have a history of district, rivalry and competition.
Relationship with key major powers, membership of the Central Asian
states in universal and regional international organizations, such as the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, the CIS, OSCE, OIS and others, are making
their policies more predictable. However, old historical rivalries between them or
with their neighbors, their vital needs and interests, the enormous economic,
social, ecological, demographic, ethnic, national and religious problems, their
geographically vulnerable location - all these pose a real political challenge that
would have a direct impact on Mongolia’s two neighbors and their relations.
It is in these circumstances that the states of the sub-region and others are
looking for appropriate political arrangements and regimes that would help them
to resolve bilateral and sub-regional problems.
Mongolia is activating its policy towards the Central Asian countries,
considering it an important aspect of its foreign policy. It has recently joined the
search for ensuring stability and predictability in this region. As one of the
concrete measures, it has proposed that the entire Central Asian region, which
for the past 47 years has been a testing ground for nuclear weapons with all the
ensuing consequences for its population and environment are, declared a NWFZ.
This would benefit not only the countries of the sub-region, but international
peace and security as a whole.
Conclusion
Mongolia’s security concept, its policy with respect to its neighbors and
other powers shows that they are not directed against their neighbors or other
countries, and that Mongolia’s unimpeded, accelerated development, adding
“weight” as well as acquiring counterweights would contribute to ensuring
stability and predictability in this part of the region.
